Commission Against Corruption, Macao SAR

The CCAC has publicised an investigation report on the SMG's typhoon forecasting procedures, where it points out that the bureau, when making typhoon forecasts and issuing warning signals for tropical cyclones, relied on the personal judgments and decisions of the former Director. There was no discussion in advance and explanation after the typhoons. It was also found that the bureau lacked an internal mechanism for meetings and discussions. When the Signal No. 3 or 8 might be issued for a typhoon taking place during non-working hours, the leader would only stay at home and make decisions through phone calls and the internet. Even the personnel of the bureau were not clear about the criteria for the issuance of typhoon warning signals. As there were many problems in the SMG in terms of personnel and equipment management, it believes that the leaders of the bureau should bear major and unshirkable responsibilities.

After typhoons "Nida" and "Hato" hit Macao respectively last year and this year, some citizens thought that the SMG released the forecasting updates too late and even made incorrect forecasts. They even suspected that the SMG might have deliberately delayed the issuance of the Signal No. 8 in the interests of gaming companies and therefore requested the CCAC to carry out an investigation. The Commissioner Against Corruption issued two orders to initiate investigations into the typhoon forecasting procedures and internal management of the SMG. The "Investigation report on the typhoon forecasting procedures and internal management of the Meteorological and Geophysical Bureau" was released today.

According to the report, the investigations carried out by the CCAC focused on the SMG's typhoon forecasting procedures and internal management. As deciding the accuracy of typhoon forecasts is within the SMG's area of expertise, the CCAC does not have the powers or technical capabilities to make the relevant judgments. After the investigations the CCAC found no evidence that the SMG's forecasting for typhoons "Nida" and "Hato" had violated the related legislation or legal procedures. There was no evidence that the SMG's decisions on issuing tropical cyclone warning signals were subject to external factors either. However, many problems were found in the typhoon forecasting procedures and the personnel and equipment management.

Regarding the decision making for typhoon forecasting, in his replies to some written inquiries from the legislative members, Fong Soi Kun, the former Director of the SMG, pointed out that, whenever a tropical cyclone warning signal was to be raised, the leadership, the relevant chiefs and meteorological technicians would have meetings together, adding that all decisions were made after detailed discussions. However, the CCAC found that the SMG did not establish a mechanism for discussions and meetings on typhoon forecasting issues. Instead, it simply replied on the personal judgments and decision making by the former Director. The forecasters had no idea whether and when a warning signal to be raised before the instructions were received from the Director.

The "discussion meetings" mentioned by the former Director were in fact summoned by him when the issuance of the Signal No. 3 or 8 might be needed during normal working hours. At the meetings held at his own office, the former Director would have discussions with the Deputy Director and the Chief of the Meteorology Division. There was no frontline forecaster involved in the process. When the said warning signals might be issued during non-working hours or on a public holiday, the Deputy Director would report the situations only to the Director by phone, and the latter would, after analysing the relevant data and information on the internet at home, decide whether to raise a typhoon warning signal. He would then notify the forecasters on duty at the bureau by phone to publicise the relevant information.

The former Director told the CCAC that the frontline meteorological technicians were only responsible for the monitoring work and making forecasts. Should they have any opinions regarding the issuance of typhoon warning signals, they should talk to the Chief of the Meteorology Division. Besides, the forecasters were less experienced than the leaders and the chiefs and their analyses might not be on point. There was therefore no need for him to communicate with the frontline personnel about typhoon issues. In the early morning of 23^rd August, he went straight into his own office when arriving at the SMG but did not go to the Meteorological Monitoring Centre to understand what was going on or exchange ideas with the frontline forecasters.

In the CCAC's opinion, the weather conditions during a typhoon are ever-changing. Therefore, with only the reports by the chiefs and the use of a computer to monitor and make judgments, it was hardly possible for the former Director to catch up on the updates about the typhoon in a holistic and timely manner. As typhoon forecasting necessitates the compilation and analysis of a great deal of information in a short period of time, it can by no means solely rely on the wisdom and professionalism of one or only a few people.

When a typhoon was approaching Macao during non-working hours, the SMG leader did not stay in or go back to the office but stayed at home instead and made the decision of issuing the Signal No. 3 or No. 8 via phone and internet. If power shortage, internet failure or telephone line disconnection occurred, the leader would not have access to the meteorological data and could not give any orders to issue warning signal from home. In this case, the typhoon forecasting system of Macao would stop running and lead to delayed or incorrect typhoon forecasts.

According to the report, the leader of the SMG went back to office in the early morning of 23^rd August. Nevertheless, making typhoon forecasts through "decision made at home" and "remote instruction" were absolutely not the working methods that public departments should adopt to deal with severe natural disasters. Such practices were hugely different from that of the counterparts of the surrounding regions and citizens' expected scenarios of making typhoon forecasts. If there were any accidents, the safety of citizens' lives and properties would be seriously threatened.

For the criteria of issuing typhoon warning signal, the former Director told the CCAC that the typhoon forecasts should not only be based on the Instructions on Tropical Cyclone Situations approved by Administrative Order no. 16/2000. The three elements including prevalence, representativeness and continuity should be taken into account also. In August 2016, the former Director told the media that when "Nida" hit Macao, although some meteorological monitoring centers recorded the wind speed that reached the lower limit of the statutory range, since the overall wind speed was slower, the criteria of prevalence and continuity of typhoons necessitating issuance of the Signal No. 8 were not met.

Before the CCAC intervened and made suggestions, the SMG did not release any document to define or explain what prevalence, representativeness and continuity mean, neither did it publish any internal guidelines on how to make typhoon forecasts according to these "three elements". Regarding this issue, the former Director said that all of their personnel had clear understanding of what the "three elements" are, adding that they had "a pretty clear idea" and "there should not be any ambiguity".

However, the CCAC found that the leaders and chiefs of the SMG had their own different interpretations of the definitions and standards of the "three elements". In this sense, when the Deputy Director substituted for the former Director, the standards adopted by the Deputy Director to make a decision of issuance of typhoon warning signal might be different. Moreover, the staff members knew little or even never heard about prevalence, representativeness and continuality and they also never heard that the "three elements" should be considered when it came to whether or not to issue typhoon warning signal.

The CCAC believed that the factors and standards for issuance of typhoon warning signal did not only matter for the leaders of the SMG. They were even not "confidential" or "concealed" information. If the forecasters of the SMG were also not clear about them, it is even impossible for the public to have any idea of them. Therefore, it is inevitable that the public would raise doubts on the accuracy of the forecasts and whether they were delayed or incorrect.

The CCAC found that there was a string of problems in the internal management of the SMG. When it comes to personnel management, the CCAC found that there were forecasters that were repeatedly redeployed to other affiliated units. Some forecaster was even redeployed for six times within a year. This situation affected the stability of the operations. Holding that some operations were already automated and computerised, the leadership reduced the number of personnel on duty at the Meteorological Monitoring Centre. This caused the forecasters not to be able to cope with the monitoring work and inquiries at the same time when there was a typhoon coming. The former Director did not find it necessary to increase manpower just for answering phone calls, as he thought that the forecasters should finish the work on weather forecasting first and answer the calls only when they have time. Therefore, during the passage of typhoon Hato, he insisted that there should only be two personnel on duty at the bureau when the Signal No. 3 was in force. It was not until the morning of 23^rd August that two more forecasters were deployed.

Regarding the rumours on the internet about the religious belief of the Deputy Director, it was difficult for the CCAC to verify whether they were true or hearsay. Nevertheless, according to the personnel the CCAC got in touch with, the rumours were widely circulated in the bureau and everyone heard of them. The rumours, along with some of her behaviour, would really make others feel uneasy, especially those who needed to work on the overnight shift. In the CCAC's opinion, the freedom of religious belief is a fundamental right of the residents. Nevertheless, personal religious belief and public entity management should not be mixed up. Public servants should not bring their religious practices or activities to work, otherwise they might pose psychological stress to the colleagues and affect the operations of their departments. The former Director stated that he had never read the posts and information on the internet and therefore did not try to find out if the rumours were true or not. In response, the CCAC points out in the report that, as the highest authority of the SMG, the Director should not turn a blind eye to rumours that affect the operations of the bureau, as avoiding the problem will greatly undermine the professional image and credibility of the bureau.

The CCAC also noticed the problems concerning the equipment management of the SMG. For example, the internet connection failed frequently and while it was off it was impossible to collect any meteorological data. The X-band meteorological radar purchased in 2009 no longer functioned since 2013 due to failure and the SMG needed to monitor weather conditions through the S-band meteorological radar shared with Zhuhai. The LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) was purchased earlier this year to monitor the data of air pollution. After installation, it was found that its laser light source did not function and it has not yet been repaired. After power outage occurred at noon of 23^rd August 2017, the generator did not function immediately due to failure of battery. With the backup power supplied by the UPS, the forecasting work of the Meteorological Observance Centre was not seriously affected. The meteorological monitoring stations in some places in Macao could not function normally due to failure of backup batteries. Due to lack of anti-flood facilities, the equipment of the water level monitoring stations and tide stations might fail as it was soaked by rainwater when there was heavy rain or strong tide.

For the problems concerning the maintenance and management of the equipment of SMG, the former Director said he did not know about them because the chiefs or staff members did not tell him. The CCAC believed that when some problems occurred repeatedly but were not solved promptly, or when some problems were big enough to have serious effect on the department's operation, the top leader of the department should intervene into the matters and follow up and solve the problems promptly and should not keep himself aloof from the problems for the reason that the relevant powers had been delegated to his subordinates or that it was the subordinates' duty to solve the problems.

According to the CCAC's report, the SMG's power of decision making on typhoon forecasting was highly centralised. As the procedures were not standardised and the criteria were not transparent, they gave rise to a certain degree of arbitrariness. When making decisions on the issuance of tropical cyclone warning signals, the leadership ignored the views of the frontline meteorological technicians. Such practices have not only demonstrated autocracy and the disregard for the opinions of the personnel, but has also revealed the egotistical attitude and professional arrogance in its decision making processes. As different people within the bureau had different interpretations of the criteria for typhoon forecasting, it was even more impossible for the public to know what the SMG had based on and considered when it comes to the issuance of typhoon warning signals. Each time when there were public queries on the forecasts after the passage of typhoons, the SMG's leaders failed to make clear the relevant details and take their responsibilities.

Following the investigation into the incident of typhoon "Nida", the leaders of the SMG eventually accepted the CCAC's suggestion and formulated internal guidelines of the criteria about "prevalence" and "continuity", but it was not until the afternoon of 22^nd August 2017 that the guidelines were passed to the forecasters on duty and the guidelines were uploaded to the intranet of the SMG that night. In response to media's interview about typhoon "Nida", the former Director also pointed out that the current definitions of the typhoon warning signals had been in force for many years and only minor revisions had been made, so it was necessary to make a comprehensive review promptly and revise the definitions in response to citizens' demands. However, when the CCAC asked him about the progress of the revision during the investigations, he denied the statement about the intention to revise the relevant administrative order and asserted that he did not see anything that required revision in the administrative order.

In the report, the CCAC suggested the SMG taking the initiative in revising the Instructions on Tropical Cyclone Situations approved by Administrative Order no. 16/2000 in order to perfect the stipulations about typhoon forecasting and typhoon warning signal issuance, setting up a specific mechanism of discussion meetings which the meteorological staff are allowed to join and a rotation system for the leaders, chiefs, forecasting staff and other staff members to stand by in the office when a typhoon warning signal is issued, and perfecting the management of personnel and equipment.

The reported has been submitted to the Chief Executive and the full text is downloadable on the CCAC's website.